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PRESERVING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO STEPS BACK

Martha McCarthy*

l. INTRODUCTION
Candor compels the acknowledgment that we can only dimly
perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in
1
this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.

This statement regarding Establishment Clause doctrine
rings as true today as it did when made by Chief Justice Burger three decades ago. The Supreme Court rendered two significant church/state decisions pertaining to schools in June
2
2000, and although handed down only nine days apart, the
Court's rationales in these cases are somewhat difficult to reconcile. In fact, it appears that the Court is heading down two
divergent paths in interpreting Establishment Clause restrictions on government action, depending on whether the contested practices involve devotionals in public schools or government assistance to sectarian schools. This article reviews
these two recent decisions and their implications for Establishment Clause doctrine and for school policies and practices.
* Martha McCarthy, Chancellor's Professor, Indiana University; Former Chair,
Educational Leadership Program; Director, Indiana Education Policy Center; Associate
Dean of the Faculties, Indiana University; President, Education Law Association;
President, University Council for Educational Administration, and Vice-President, Division A of the American Educational Research Association. Publications: Coauthor,
PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS (Allyn and Bacon, 1''- 4'"
eds., 1998) and author or coauthor of several other books and more than 150 articles on
various aspects of students' and teachers' rights, church-state relations, curriculum
censorship, equity issues, and education reform efforts. Recent law review articles: Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause? (IND. L.J., 2000) and Students as Targets and Perpetrators of Sexual Harassment: Title IX and Beyond
(HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J., in press).
1. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
2. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 793 (2000); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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II. THE SANTA FE CASE
In Santa Fe Independent School District u. Doe, the Supreme Court, in a six-to-three ruling, struck down a Texas
school district's policy authorizing student-led devotionals before public school football games as violating the Establishment
3
Clause of the First Amendment. Parents initially filed suit in
1995, complaining of numerous proselytizing activities (e.g.,
teachers promoting Christian revival meetings and chastising
children of minority faiths) in addition to the school district's
practice of allowing student council officers to read overtly
Christian prayers at graduation ceremonies and home football
games. The school district altered its policy pertaining to
graduation devotionals several times prior to and during the
litigation in an effort to ensure compliance with Fifth Circuit
precedent upholding student elections to authorize nonproselytizing, nonsectarian, student-led graduation invocations and
4
benedictions. The district finally formalized its football game
invocations in a policy essentially identical to the graduation
prayer policy, in that both authorized two elections; one to determine whether to have invocations, and the second to select
the student to deliver them. Subsequently, the district removed
the "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing" restriction on the prayers
in both policies, but included the notation that if judicially enjoined, the prior policies with this restriction would automati5
cally be in effect. The trial court ultimately found that the
challenged proselytizing incidents had been curbed and were
not attributable to school district policies or customs, and
moreover that the plaintiffs did not prove compensable harm.
But the court ordered the school district to reinstate the "nonproselytizing, nonsectarian" restriction in its policies pertaining to student-led devotionals at graduations and football
games.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated its
position that student-initiated graduation prayers can satisfy
3. 530 U.S. 290 (2000),120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
4. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert
denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993). For a discussion of the somewhat complicated developments during the early stages of the Santa Fe litigation, see Doe v. Santa Fe Indcp.
Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 809-814 (5'" Cir. 1999).
5. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812-13. The policy was again modified to eliminate
"prayer" from its title and to add references to student-led "messages" and "statements"
in addition to "invocations."
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the Establishment Clause, but disagreed with the district
Court's conclusion that prayers referring to specific deities are
nonsectarian. Focusing on the football game devotionals, the
appeals court held that this policy abridged the Establishment
Clause, even if the restriction on the type of prayers was rein6
stated. The appeals court distinguished student-led prayers in
graduation ceremonies from such devotionals at athletic events
that occur more frequently, involve a more diverse age span of
students, and can hardly be justified to make sporting events
more solemn.
The Supreme Court agreed to review this decision, limiting
its ruling to the policy pertaining to student-led prayers before
football games. Plaintiffs argued that having students decide to
include invocations at the athletic events and to identify a
classmate to lead the devotionals removed public school sponsorship because the devotionals were initiated by private actors. Accordingly, they asserted that such private student expression should be treated like other private speech in that it
does not implicate Establishment Clause restrictions on government action.
The Supreme Court majority disagreed with these assertions and went beyond simply affirming the reasoning of the
appellate court. The majority addressed the broader issue of
the legal status of student-led devotionals in public education,
making some important statements regarding what constitutes
religious expression that is sponsored by the public school or at
least perceived to be. The Santa Fe majority declared that student-led expression at a school event held on school property
under the supervision of school personnel and representing the
7
student body could not be considered private speech. Even
6. Id. at 816-18. The appellate court emphasized that the "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing" limitation had been important when it upheld student-initiated graduation prayers, but concluded that this restriction could not save the student-led prayers
before football games from being invalidated under the Establishment Clause. In Clear
Creek 977 F.2d 963, supra note 4, the court further noted that, "a policy is not insulated
from constitutional scrutiny under the Establishment Clause merely because it permits
rather than requires religious speech when selected and given by students." I d. at 81516. Earlier, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had described a high school graduation
as a "once-in-a-lifetime event" contrasted with athletic events that are held in settings
far less solemn and extraordinary. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d
402, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding an Establishment Clause violation in a school district allowing employees to lead or encourage prayers in curricular or extracurricular
public school activities).
7. 530 U.S. at 309-10.
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though students made the ultimate choice of speakers and content, the school authorized the student election in the first
place. The degree of school involvement gave the impression
that the devotionals at issue represented the school, leading
the Court majority to conclude that the practice entailed both
8
perceived and actual endorsement of religion. The majority
reasoned that the policy had a sham secular purpose and, like
the district's previous initiatives, was intended to promote
9
Christian religious observances in school-related events. While
rejecting the argument that Establishment Clause concerns
can be eliminated by delegating decisions to students, the majority emphasized that nothing in the Constitution prohibits
public school students from voluntarily praying at school; only
state sponsorshi~ of such devotionals runs afoul of the Estab0
lishment Clause.
The Court in Santa Fe reiterated a commitment to the purpose of the Bill of Rights, which is to shield certain subjects
from the political process, and noted that the Establishment
Clause is intended "to remove debate over this kind of issue
11
from governmental supervision or control." From its recent
decision in Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System
v. Southworth, the Court emphasized that a student referendum substituting "majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality" would undermine the constitutional principle that "minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority
12
views." Indeed, the Court reasoned that the use of student
elections simply intensifies the lack of representation of minority views, ensuring that they will never be heard.
The Santa Fe majority relied heavily on Lee v. Weisman in
8. !d. at 305. Chief Justice Rehnquist severely chastised the majority for striking down the revised policy before it had even been implemented. See id. at 318
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); infra text accompanying note 21.
9. !d. at 308-09. The Court noted that the school did not hold a new election pursuant to the revised policy but used the results of the election held under the previous
policy, indicating a continuation of practices to infuse devotionals in public school activities. !d. at 309. The Court emphasized that it is necessary to carefully review the
history and context of the challenged action in determining its facial validity. !d. at
303. See also infra note 84.
10. !d. at 313.
11. !d. at 310.
12. !d. at 304, quoting Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (upholding a university's mandatory student activity fees, but
ruling that student elections to determine what speech is subsidized by the university
run afoul of the Free Speech Clause by disenfranchising minority viewpoints).
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which the Supreme Court struck down clergy-led devotionals in
13
public school graduations in 1992. In Weisman, the Court
held that at a minimum, students cannot be coerced to support
or participate in religious exercises or to make a choice between
a meaningful school event and being subjected to devotionals
14
that offend their religious beliefs. However, the Court in 1992
did not address the constitutionality of student-initiated devotionals, which became a very volatile issue in the wake of
Weisman as religious groups and public school districts sought
creative ways to comply with the letter (if not the intent) of the
Supreme Court's decision. Challenges to such student-led reli15
gious activities generated conflicting appellate court rulings,
but in the most recent opinions, momentum seemed to be building to protect student-initiated devotionals as private expression under the Free Speech Clause. To illustrate, the Santa Fe
decision was rendered on the heels of two rulings in which the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld student-initiated sectarian graduation messages and other private religious expression in public schools. Hi
A number of school districts welcomed a broad interpretation of Free Speech Clause protection of student religious expression and accordingly allowed students to orchestrate
graduation prayers, and in some instances, allowed student17
initiated religious expression in other school activities. But
13. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
14. !d. But only Justice Kennedy in the Weisman majority asserted that such coercion was required to abridge the Establishment Clause. See infra text accompanying
note 106.
15. For example, compare Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) (upholding student elections to decide
whether to have student-led graduation devotionals) with ACLU of NJ v. Blackhorse
Pike RPgional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (striking down such student
elections among seniors to determine whether prayers will be included in the graduation cer~mony).
16. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000), on remand sub nom., Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d
1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (lifting injunction on private religious speech and affording Free
Speech Clause protection to student-initiated religious expression in school-related activities); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding
school policy allowing students to select their graduation messages), vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
17. There has been some controversy regarding efforts to designate students'
graduation speeches as a forum for student expression that will not be subject to prior
review by school authorities. The Supreme Court has not clarified whether school authorities can relinquish control over students' graduation speeches, although generally
assumed they can. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998),
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the legitimacy of such practices may be short lived as the Supreme Court in Santa Fe appears to have dealt a severe blow to
this trend of expanding what is considered private religious expression that is entitled to Free Speech Clause protection. JH
The Court's conclusion that school districts abridge the Establishment Clause by allowing students to decide to have student-led devotionals at school-sponsored athletic events will
likely be used by those contesting graduation invocations and
other types of student-orchestrated religious expression in public schools.
In his biting dissent in Santa Fe, Chief Justice Rehnquist
not only faulted the majority for its holding but also for its
tone, which he claimed "bristles with hostility to all things reli19
gious in public life." Asserting plausible secular purposes for
the policy (e.g., to promote good sportsmanship and student
safety and to establish the appropriate environment for the
event), the Chief Justice argued that courts should defer to a
school district's articulated intent for the practices. He further
contended that the speech at issue under the contested policy
should be considered private expression. Declaring that government policies are not required to be completely neutral as to
20
religious content, he faulted the majority for distorting exist-

vacated and remanded en bane, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding Idaho school
district's policy that barred school authorities from censoring students' graduation
speeches and granted student speakers, selected by academic standing, discretion to
select their messages). Although the full Ninth Circuit vacated the ruling because the
plaintiffs had graduated, the controversial policy remained in force. Yet, courts generally have ruled that schools are not required to consider the graduation ceremony as a
forum for student expression and can exert control over students' speeches. If they do
exercise such administrative approval, they may be obligated to censor speeches that
promote religious tenets. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th
Cir. 2000) (relying on Weisman and Santa Fe in upholding a school district's rejection
of a student's sectarian graduation speech, as the speech would bear the imprint of the
school district and constitute government endorsement of religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause).
18. 530 U.S. 290, 309-15 (2000).
19. !d. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
20. !d. at 325. He accused the majority of applying "the most rigid version of the
oft-criticized" tripartite Lemon test (requiring government action to have a secular
purpose, to have a primary effect that neither advances nor impedes religion, and to
avoid excessive government entanglement with religion). Id. at 319. See infra note 60.
However, the majority only briefly referred to Lemon, Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314. The
majority focused on the contested policy's sham secular purpose more than on the other
elements of the tripartite test, causing Zirkel to characterize the majority opinion as
"lightly evoking nuances" of the Lemon test. See Perry Zirkel, The Games, They Are AChangin', 82 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 175 (2000).
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ing precedent and invalidating the school district's new policy
21
before it had even been put into place. He considered therevised policy a good-faith effort to comply with the district
Court's order.
Advocates of church/state separation were relieved that the
Court in Santa Fe concluded that the student-led devotionals
at issue represented the school because a contrary conclusion
would have given a green light to all types of student-organized
religious activities in public education. But the ruling generated volatile reactions from conservative citizen groups and
from some school districts that wanted to retain such practices.
Jan LaRue of the conservative Family Research Council asserted that, "the government's 'benign neutrality' toward reli52
ion in this country is nothing short of malevolent hostility."
Illustrative of protests against the ruling, in the fall 2000, fans
at football games in a number of school districts throughout the
south, including the Santa Fe district, stood and "spontane23
ously" recited the Lord's prayer. Rob Boston for Americans
United for Separation of Church and State indicated that his
organization had received numerous reports of informal pro24
tests at school events as a result of the Santa Fe ruling. Julie
Underwood, General Counsel for the National School Boards
Association, said that school prayer advocates are using other
creative strategies to bring religion into schools, such as giving
25
students book covers with religious messages on them.

III. THE HELMS CASE
In the second ruling rendered nine days after Santa Fe, the
Supreme Court in Mitchell u. Helms found no Establishment
Clause violation in using federal aid to purchase instructional
26
materials and equipment for student use in sectarian schools.

21. 5:30 U.S. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
22. Jan LaRue, Family Research Council, quoted in Supreme Court Says 'No' to
Student-led Prayers, THE HERALD-TIMES, BLOOMINGTON, IN, June 20, 2000, at Al,
All.

23. Movement Hopes to Skirt Supreme Court Ruling, THE HERALD-TIMES,
BLOOMINCTON, IN, August 24, 2000, at A7.
24. Group Reports Prayer Protests as School Year Begins, (Sept. 1, 2000)
<http://www.CNN.com>.
25. .Julie Underwood, quoted in Courts Will Rule on Important School Issues,
SCHOOL BOARD NEWS, September 26, 2000, at 6.
26. 120 S. Cl. 2530 (2000). On remand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
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Specifically, the ruling allows public funds for computers, other
instructional equipment, and library books that are used in religious schools under the Federal Chapter 2 program of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 (originally part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965), which is now Subchapter VI of Chapter 70 of the Im27
proving America's Schools Act of 1994. In the school district
at issue, abou~ 30% of these funds are allocated for such
equipment and materials in private - primarily sectarian schools. Considerable attention focused on this case because
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had struck down the practice
under the Establishment Clause, creating a conflict with the
position taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals a few
28
years earlier. Compared to the Santa Fe ruling, the Supreme
Court's action is more difficult to analyze in Helms because it
has no majority opinion. While six Justices supported the
29
Court's holding, only four signed the Helms plurality opinion.
Respondents argued that the aid was divertible for religious
purposes, was direct and nonincidental, and supplanted rather
than supplemented private school funds. Justice Thomas,
speaking for the plurality, found none of these contentions persuasive, rejecting a distinction between direct and indirect aid
that has appeared in prior cases involving challenges to the use
30
of government funds in religious schools. The plurality reachanged its position regarding the federal aid program and its Louisiana counterpart to
conform with the Supreme Court ruling and reinstated its judgment that the Louisiana
special education program and transportation program (providing public support for
children attending parochial schools) were also constitutional. Helms v. Picard, 229
F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2000).
27. 20 U.S. C.§§ 7301-7373. Prior to 1994, this provision was codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 2911-2976.
28. Compare Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998) with Walker v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no Establishment
Clause violation in the distribution of Chapter 2 funds to parochial schools).
29. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy signed Justice
Thomas' plurality opinion, and Justices O'Connor and Breyer signed a concurring opinion.
30. 120 S. Ct. at 2544-46. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985) (striking down shared-time and community-education programs providing
classes for nonpublic school students at public expense in rooms leased from the nonpublic schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (invalidating direct government
subsidies to parochial schools in terms of funds for remedial, guidance, and therapeutic
services provided on parochial school grounds and for instructional materials and
equipment, standardized tests, and fieldtrip transportion for parochial school students); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973)
(invalidating direct public aid to parochial schools for the development and administra-
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soned that religious indoctrination or subsidization cannot be
attributed to the government when aid, even direct aid, is distributed based on secular criteria, is available to religious and
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis, and flows to
31
religious schools only because of private choices of parents.
Also rejecting the argument that the aid was unconstitutional because it could be diverted for religious purposes, the
plurality relied on the neutrality principle in concluding that if
eligibility for the aid is determined in a manner that satisfies
the Constitution, subsequent use of the aid for religious purposes is not imputed to the government, "and is thus not of
32
constitutional concern." Justice Thomas declared for the plurality: "We did not, as respondents do, think that the use of
governmental aid to further religious indoctrination was synonymous with religious indoctrination by the government or
that such use of aid created any improper incentives" for par3
ents to send their children to religious schools.a Conceding that
the equipment at issue could be diverted for sectarian uses, the
plurality asserted that the central issue is not divertibility of
the aid because government support for secular activities always frees parochial school resources for religious purposes.
Instead, the plurality emphasized that the constitutional standards are whether the aid itself would be appropriate for a public school to receive and whether it is distributed in an evenhanded manner - conditions satisfied by the aid at issue in
Helms. The plurality also dismissed the concern about public
funds going to "pervasively sectarian" institutions, concluding
that such an assessment of "degree" discriminates on the basis
14
of religion. :
Justices O'Connor and Breyer provided the crucial concur35
ring votes to uphold the government aid program in Helms.
They agreed with the four Justices in the plurality that Meek v.
36
37
Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter were no longer good law in
tion of state-required and teacher-prepared tests and record-keeping practices).
31. 120 S. Ct. at 2541.
32. !d. at 2547. See discussion of the current application of the neutrality principle, infra text accompanying note 95.
33. !d. [emphasis added].
34. !d. at 2550-51.
35. !d. at 2556 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
36. 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down use of public funds for instructional materials and equipment and provision of auxiliary services in parochial schools).
37. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), supra note 30.
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so far as these decisions would prohibit the distribution of aid
for instructional materials and equipment that might be used
for some sectarian purposes. Among their holdings, Meek and
Wolman had barred state aid in the form of providing maps,
slide projectors, and other materials and equipment to sectarian schools. These six Justices also supported a modification of
the Lemon test, making it explicit that excessive entanglement
38
is simply part of consideration of a policy's effect. The plurality and concurring Justices identified three criteria for assessing a statute's primary effect: whether it results in government
indoctrination, defines recipients by reference to religion, or
39
creates excessive government entanglement with religion.:
But Justices O'Connor and Breyer were troubled by parts of
the sweeping plurality rationale, which they feared would go
too far in allowing direct aid that advances sectarian objectives
of religious organizations. They disagreed with the plurality's
conclusion that any government-aid program would be constitutional solely because the aid is neutrally distributed to religious and secular entities. They also seemed more interested
than the plurality in assurances that the aid supplements and
does not supplant private school funds, and that actual diver40
sion of the aid to religious purposes is de minimis.
Justice Souter, writing a dissenting opinion that was also
signed by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, found many aspects
of the plurality opinion problematic. Most importantly, Justice
Souter asserted that the plurality adopted "a new conception of
neutrality as a practically sufficient test of constitutionality
that would, if adopted by the Court, eliminate inquiry into a
41
law's effects" and negate the constitutional principle that the

38. This modified Lemon standard is more akin to the Establishment Clause
standard used prior to 1970. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (assessing the purpose and effect of challenged government action in
striking down daily Bible reading in public schools). Although the Lemon tripartite test
received its name in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court actually articulated the three criteria the year before in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to property tax exemptions for
property used solely for religious worship). See supra note 20 for a description of the
three-prong test.
39. The district Court's conclusion that the law has a secular purpose was not
challenged. Also, the Supreme Court accepted the district Court's conclusion that there
was no excessive entanglement and thus focused on the first two criteria in determining that the law's effect was constitutional. See 120 S. Ct., at 2540.
40. !d. at 2562-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. !d. at 2573 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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government cannot aid a school's religious mission. He contended that, "the plurality position breaks fundamentally with
Establishment Clause principle, and with the methodology
42
painstakingly worked out in support of it." He noted that over
time the principle of neutrality had been used in at least three
ways - to identify the appropriate government posture between impermissible encouragement or discouragement of religion, to characterize a government benefit as secular, and
now to indicate nondiscrimination in conferring benefits on
43
secular and religious institutions. Justice Souter vigorously
argued that "evenhandedness neutrality" should not be a
44
stand-alone criterion to assess constitutional intent or effect.
He noted that government aid to pervasively sectarian institutions and to primary and secondary religious schools
raises particular concerns because younE students are highly
susceptible to religious indoctrination. While all Justices
agreed that the government is prohibited from providing aid
with a clear religious content to public or sectarian schools, the
three dissenting Justices would have gone further than the plurality in prohibiting aid that can be diverted to religious education, particularly direct subsidies to religious schools. Justice
Souter cited evidence that the aid at issue in Helms already
had been diverted for sectarian purposes in some of the parochial schools. He also contended that a federal education aid
program, such as this one that can be used to supplant expenditures for offerings at religious schools, is constitutionally prohibited.
Those advocating public support for private education were
encouraged by the Helms ruling, as were proponents of voucher
programs that allow public funds to flow to parochial schools
46
based on parental choices. But critics have voiced great concern that Helms will open the floodgates regarding government
aid to religious schools. Barry Lynn, Executive Director of
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, has asserted that the Helms decision "takes a sled,Behammer" to the
wall of separation between church and state.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

ld.
!d. at 2578. See infra text accompanying note 90.
Id. at 2581.
ld. at 2583.
See infra text accompanying note 98.
Barry Lynn, quoted in Supreme Court Ruling Expands Public Aid to Paro-
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IV. INTERNAL CONSISTENCY IN THESE DIVERGENT PATHS?

Comparing Helms and Santa Fe, it appears that a block of
Justices is unwilling to accommodate religious observances in
public schools, while a different block (with some overlap) is
willing to accommodate sectarian schools in terms of government aid for their students. Thus, the Court appears to be
heading down somewhat incongruent tracks in these two areas
of Establishment Clause litigation involving education. The
"private actor" justification for church/state involvement seems
persuasive in state-aid cases in that neutrality is assured and
government involvement reduced if aid goes to religious schools
because of parents' decisions regarding where their children
will be educated. However, allowing students to vote to deliver
religious messages in public schools does not provide a sufficient circuit breaker to make the students private actors, which
would remove school sponsorship of the student-led religious
48
activities.
Only Justice Kennedy endorsed the majority opinion in
Santa Fe and the plurality opinion in Helms, and Justices
O'Connor and Breyer joined him in supporting, in part, the different interpretations of Establishment Clause restrictions in
the two cases. There is some sentiment that the two lines of
cases are internally congruent in applying the Establishment
49
Clause, but such consistency is more apparent in recent judicial pronouncements regarding state aid to parochial schools
than in the judicial posture toward religious influences in public education.
A. The Movement Toward Accommodation in State-Aid Cases
The Supreme Court's support of religious accommodations
in terms of allowing government support for rarochial school
5
students has been steady at least since 1993, with some evichial Schools, Sell. Bo. NEWS, July 11, 2000, at 1, 8.
48. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. al 2541-42; Santa Fe v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. at
2277-79.
49. See Mark Walsh, Church-State Rulings Cut Both Ways, EDUC. WEEK, July 12,
2000, at 1, 40.
50. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997) (lifting injunction and rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to the use of
pubic school personnel to provide remedial services in parochial schools); Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not require a public university to deny student activity funds to stu-
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51

dence of the accommodationist trend much earlier. After all,
government aid to provide transportation and secular textbooks for parochial school students has been upheld since the
52
mid-twentieth century, and these precedents have not been
disturbed. Despite Justice Souter's assertion that government
53
aid used to supplant private school funds is unconstitutional,
for decades the use of public funds to provide textbooks for parochial school students has allowed the sectarian school's textbook funds to be redirected for religious purposes. Also, the Supreme Court in 1980 found government support for staterequired testing programs in private schools to be constitutional,54 casting doubt on its earlier pronouncements that aid to
develop and administer state-required as well as teacherdeveloped tests abridges the Establishment Clause because
such tests potentially could be used to advance sectarian pur-

dent groups that will use the funds to distribute sectarian publications); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to the use of public funds for sign language interpreters to assist hearing deficient children in parochial schools). But see Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994); infra note 61.
51. As Justice Thomas observed in Helms, "the principles of neutrality and private choice, and their relationship to each other, were prominent not only in Agostini
[citation omitted!, but also in Zobrest, Witters, and Mueller." 120 S. Ct. at 2542. See
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 4 74 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding use of
federal vocational rehabilitation aid to support ministerial training); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding state tax benefit for educational expenses available to
parents of public or private school students).
52. See Board ofEduc. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1962) (finding no Establishment Clause violation in a state law requiring public school districts to
loan secular textbooks to all secondary students, including those attending parochial
schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (rejecting an Establishment
Clause challenge to the use of public funds to provide transportation services for nonpublic school students); Cochran v. Louisiana State Ed. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930)
(rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a state law requiring books to be furnished free to students attending public or private schools). Everson often is cited as
the beginning of the separationist period in interpreting the Establishment Clause in
terms of state aid to parochial schools, because, despite its holding, the Court made a
strong separationist statement: "Neither a state nor the Federal government can ...
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another .... In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state,"' 330 U.S. at 1516. But the Everson Court also showed some support for the nondiscrimination theory,
recognizing that the state "cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any
other faith, because of the faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." !d. at 16.
53. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 258il-89 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
54. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
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55

poses.
Then, in 1993, the Supreme Court found no Establishment
Clause violation in using public funds for sign language inter56
preters in parochial schools, signaling a paradigm shift that
was solidified in 1997 when the Supreme Court overturned the
prohibition against allowing public school personnel to provide
57
remedial instruction in religious schools. In both of these decisions, the Court rejected the notion that the Establishment
Clause lays down an "absolute bar to the placing of a public
58
employee in a sectarian school." And with Helms explicitly
overturning the holdings of Meek and Wolman regarding the
use of public funds for instructional equipment and materials
in sectarian schools, there are very few rulings left that reflect
the Supreme Court's separationist stance in connection with
state aid to nonpublic schools. In fact, the Supreme Court
seems to have dismantled most of the decisions, rendered during the heyday of the stringent Lemon test, in which it struck
59
down various types ofpublic assistance to private schools.
The only separationist decisions of this period that have not
been eroded at least in part by subsequent Supreme Court
opinions involved government aid made available solely to private schools or their patrons, such as support for nonpublic
school teachers' salaries in secular subjects, grants to maintain
private school facilities, and reimbursement to parents for a
60
portion of private school tuition. And the only separationist

55. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 4 72
(1973), supra note 30; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), supra note 36.
56. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
57. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), overturning its ruling that barred the
use of public school personnel to provide Title I remedial services on sectarian school
premises, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and the portion of its decision that
invalidated a shared-time program under which public school classes were provided for
parochial school students on parochial school premises, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), supra note 30. See Ralph Mawdsley, Extending the Limits of
Permissible Government-Religion Interaction: Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 124
EDUC. L. REP. 499, 501 (1998).
58. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
59. This lends some support to Justice Thomas' assertion that Meek and Wolman
were simply anomalies, 120 S. Ct. at 2540. See supra notes 30 and 36.
60. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (striking down reimbursement to
parents for part of tuition paid to nonpublic schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down direct grants for maintenance and repair of private schools, tuition reimbursements to parents of nonpublic
school children, and tax benefits restricted to parents of private school students);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down a Rhode Island statute calling
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decision in this domain in the 1990s was Board of Education v.
Grumet, in which the Supreme Court struck down a legislative
attempt to create a separate school district to serve specialneeds Satmar Hasidic children whose strict form of Judaism
61
does not allow them to be educated with non-Satmars.
B. The Winding Path Involving Student-led Devotionals in
Public Schools

The federal judiciary's posture pertaining to devotional activities in public schools does not reflect as consistent a trend
in recent Establishment Clause interpretations. Notwithstanding assertions that public education is the last bastion of
62
church/state separation, several contrary federal appellate
decisions have been rendered recently, and some Supreme
Court action regarding religious influences in public schools is
difficult to categorize as separationist. Most of these cases have
involved an expansive view of constitutional protection of private religious expression that does not implicate Establishment
Clause restrictions.
Starting in the early 1980s the Supreme Court began emphasizing the First Amendment principle of equal access for
and equal treatment of private religious expression. Ira Lupu
has observed that, "even the standard-bearers of the separationist tradition have been prepared to cede territory in the
name of competing rights ... [that] include the rights to be free
of official discrimination with respect to religious exercise,
61
freedom of speech, and freedom of association." " Some com-

for salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in private schools and a Pennsylvania statute calling for reimbursement to private schools of the costs of teachers'
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in secular subjects). See also Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking down state
aid earmarked only for private schools in connection with various testing and recordkeeping practices), supra note 30. But the Court subsequently upheld state aid made
available for state-required testing and recordkeeping practices in both public and private schools, Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980), supra note 54.
61. 512 U.S. 687 (1994). But see Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F'.3d 1068
(8th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998) (upholding a school district's decision
to reopen a one-class school with a modified curriculum in response to a request from
the Brethren sect); Mawdsley, Extending the Limits of Permissible GovernmentReligion Interaction, supra note 57.
62. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 230, 231-34 (1994).
63. ld. at 249.
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mentators have traced the origins of the current version of neutrality that prohibits discrimination against religious viewpoints to Widmar v. Vincent, in which the Supreme Court held
in 1981 that state-supported universities could not discriminate against religious groups in making campus facilities
64
available for student organizations to meet. But Douglas Laycock has argued that the roots of the nondiscrimination neutrality theory can be traced much further back in First
65
Amendment litigation.
At the precollegiate level, the Free Speech Clause principle
was augmented in 1984 by the Equal Access Act (EAA), under
which federally assisted secondary schools that have established a limited forum for student groups to meet during noninstructional time cannot deny school access to noncurriculum
student groups based on the religious, philosophical, or politi66
cal content of their meetings. In 1990, the Supreme Court in
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens
rejected the contention that the EAA abridges the Establishment Clause because student religious groups are allowed to
meet, recognizing the law's clear secular purpose of preventin~
discrimination against religious and other private expression.
The Court emphasized that unlike government speech promoting religion that is prohibited by the Establishment Clause,
private religious expression is protected by the Free Speech
6R
and Free Exercise Clauses. In subsequent cases, federal appellate courts have ruled that the EAA prevails over state constitutional provisions requiring greater separation of church
69
and state than demanded by the Establishment Clause, and

64. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers 46 EMORY L. J. 1, 21
(1997); Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, supra note 62, at 247. See also
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), where Chief Justic0
Rehnquist claimed that the Establishment Clause does "not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor ... prohibit the federal government from
providing non-discriminatory aid to religion."
65. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43, 62 (1997).
66. 20 U.S. C. §§ 4071-4074 (2000).
67. 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990).
68. !d. at 250.
69. See Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d
1535 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on the EAA to allow student religious group to meet during lunch period since it was noninstructional time and other student groups were allowed to meet); Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
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have allowed student religious groups to require certain officers to be Christians to safeguard the spiritual content of their
.
70
meetmgs.
During the 1990s, the Supreme Court made some definitive
pronouncements about the protection of private religious expression against viewpoint discrimination. In Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District, the Court held
that if secular community groups are allowed to use the public
school after school hours to address particular topics (i.e., family life and child rearing), groups that approach these topics
from religious perspectives cannot be denied public school access.71 In essence, school districts cannot enforce policies governing facility use during nonschool time that entail viewpoint
discrimination against a religious group's message. Some
courts have broadly interpreted the Lambs Chapel principle in
protecting religious viewpoints from differential treatment
72
with respect to public school access during nonschool time.
denied, 510 U.S. 819 (1993) (finding that the EAA prevailed over antiestablishment
provisions in state law; a student religious group could not be barred from the public
school's limited forum for student meetings).
70. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1040 (1996).
71. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
72. See, e.g., Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. One, 826 F. Supp. 1320
(D. Wyo. 1993) (ruling that a religious group could rent the high school gymnasium for
a baccalaureate program because other community groups were allowed to use the
school gym for various events; finding no school sponsorship even though the school
band performed and the school's graduation announcements included the baccalaureate program). But courts have ruled that the government can prohibit religious worship in a limited forum. See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd, 231 F.3d
937 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no viewpoint discrimination in school district's policy permitting use of school facilities for recreational and civic activities and excluding political meetings, for-profit fund-raising, and religious services); Bronx Household of Faith
v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1074 (1998) (upholding a school district's prohibition on religious groups using the public school on a weekly basis for Sunday worship services, reasoning that the prohibition
on worship services was viewpoint neutral and appropriate in a limited forum). The
line may not always be clear, however, between religious worship, which can be barred
from a limited forum, and the discussion of topics from a religious perspective, which
must be allowed on any topic that is addressed in the forum from a secular perspective.
Compare Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir.
1994), cert denied, 515 U.S. 1173 (1995) (holding that since scouts were allowed to meet
at a public middle school after school hours to discuss character education, it would be
viewpoint discrimination to bar a parent-led religious youth group access to address
the same topic) with Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 502 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000) (upholding a school district's denial of
school access to a religious youth organization under its "community use" policy because the meetings would entail religious instruction and prayer). Perhaps the Su-
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A 1995 higher education decision, Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, can be classified as a
"state-aid" case, but the Supreme Court also addressed the
equal treatment of private religious and secular expression.
Ruling that a public university could not withhold support from
a student religious group seeking to use student activity funds
to publish sectarian materials, the Court majority concluded
that religious material must be treated like other material in
73
student-initiated publications. The majority denounced the
University's attempt to deny support to the religious group as
discriminating against religious viewpoints of private persons
whose speech it subsidizes. The Court held that the government's equal treatment of religious and secular private expression is not only permitted by the Establishment Clause, but in
some circumstances is required by the Free Speech Clause. The
majority reasoned that since the institution was providing
"secular printing services on a religion-blind basis," there was
"no Establishment Clause violation in the University's honor74
ing its duties under the Free Speech Clause."
Given the Supreme Court's protection of private religious
expression against viewpoint discrimination in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger, it is not surprising that several federal appellate courts have relied on these rulin~s in broadly interpreting
what constitutes such private speech. As noted previously, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals delivered two recent rulings
that represent an expansive stance regarding the reach of the
Free Speech Clause in protecting students' private religious

preme Court will use the latter case to provide some clarification regarding the contentJviewpoint and worship/expression distinctions in facility-use policies.
73. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
74. I d. at 848. See Arval A. Morris, Separation of Church and State?- Remarks
on Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 103 EDUC. L. REP. 553-71 (1995).
75. Even before these decisions, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
practice of allowing students to decide by election whether to have student-led graduation devotionals. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.
1991), vacated and remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), on remand, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993). After two federal appellate courts reached an
opposite conclusion, the Supreme Court muddied the waters by vacating the Ninth Circuit ruling, thus reinstating the federal district court's decision that upheld a policy
allowing students to determine the fate of student-led graduation devotionals. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1155 (1996). See
also ACLU of N.J. v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir.
1996), supra note 15.
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expression in public schools. In Adler v. Duval County, after a
lengthy series of court orders, in 2000, the full court reversed
the appellate panel's decision that had invalidated a contested
77
school district policy. The appellate court en bane upheld the
policy that authorizes public school seniors to select classmates
to give graduation messages and allows the speakers to choose
the content, which could be religious. Although the school district's memo outlining the policy was entitled "Graduation
Prayer," the court emphasized that the student election is not
to identify a classmate to deliver a prayer; the graduation message is of unspecified content, which may or may not include a
prayer.
In the second Eleventh Circuit ruling, the appeals court in
Chandler v. James lifted the part of an injunction that had
prohibited students from publicly expressing religious views in
78
most school settings in the Dekalb County, Alabama district.
The court declared that the Establishment Clause does notrequire and the Free Speech Clause does not permit suppression
of student-initiated religious expression in public schools. The
court emphasized that a school policy tolerating religion "does
79
not improperly endorse it." However, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate decisions in both Chandler and Adler and
remanded the cases for further consideration in light of Santa
Fe.
In October, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit in Chandler reinstated its earlier judgment that the injunction could not prohibit genuinely student-initiated religious speech or regulate
80
such expression differently from private secular expression.
The appeals court reiterated that the district court's injunction
swept too broadly because it equated all student religious
speech in a public context at school with expression representing the public school. Distinguishing the Supreme Court's con-

76. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and re·
manded, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000), on remand sub nom., Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d
1313 (11th Cir. 2000); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000),
vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 31 (2000); supra note 16.
77. 174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and different results on rehearing en
bane, 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000). See also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No 321, 147
F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded en bane, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999),
supra note 17.
78. Chandler, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999).
79. /d. at 1261.
80. Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).
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demnation of school-sponsored student prayer in Santa Fe, the
appeals court held that Chandler dealt with school censorship
of students' private religious expression, which is also unconstitutional. If the Supreme Court agrees to review Chandler,
perhaps it will clarify the circumstances under which religious
speech in public schools is protected by the Free Speech Clause
as private expression, and how much control school authorities
must exert over the activities for the student expression to represent the school.
The contention that there is a consistent pattern in cases
addressing student-led devotionals in public schools or even in
the Supreme Court's action in this domain is a stretch. The
tension between separationist doctrine and the equal access/treatment concept continues to generate a range of rulings
81
regarding religious expression in public schools. Furthermore,
the legal status of several other issues pertaining to sectarian
influences in public education remains ambiguous. For example, although it appeared settled that public schools would
abridge the Establishment Clause if they allowed religious
groups to come into the schools to distribute Bibles and other
2
religious materials,R some recent decisions do not follow this
pattern. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a West
Virginia school district's policy allowing sectarian organizations along with political groups to distribute materials, such
as Bibles, in public schools on a designated day because the organizations were considered private entities that do not repre83
sent the school. Also, despite the Supreme Court's 1980 ruling
that struck down a state law calling for the posting of the Ten
81. See Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, supra note 62, at 249. In
addition to some expansive judicial interpretations of the constitutional protection that
should be given to private religious expression, see supra note 76, other appellate rulings do not fit a separationist mold. See, e.g., Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112
F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding a Georgia law that requires a moment for silent
reflection at the beginning of the day in all public schools); Sherman v. Community
Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting Establishment Clause
challenge to an Illinois law requiring the daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance to
the American flag in public schools, as the phrase "Under God" does not change this
patriotic observance into a prayer).
82. See, e.g, Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995);
Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 508
u.s. 911 (1993).
83. Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998). See also
Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No. 307, 707 F. Supp. 1005 (C.D. III.
1989) (upholding distribution of Gideon Bibles on the school-owned sidewalk in front of
a high school, because it was considered a public forum for use by the general public).
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Commandments in public schools, this topic has recently become controversial again with several state legislatures enacting provisions calling for the Ten Commandments to be displayed with other historical documents in public buildings,
85
including schools.
Notwithstanding a number of unresolved issues and the absence of a consistent pattern in public school Establishment
Clause opinions, the Santa Fe ruling has at least put a damper
on efforts to extend free speech protection to all devotional activities that are led by students in public schools. Thus, for the
present, it appears that the Establishment Clause may have
more vitality in public school controversies than in connection
with government funds flowing to religious schools.
V. NEW NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE

Heutra z·~ty

•hT

· ... a coat or many co zors. ~

~s

This observation made by Justice Harlan more than thirty
years ago understates the difficulties involved in defining the
governmental neutrality toward religion that the First
Amendment demands. The search for the appropriate standard
to govern church/state relations certainly is not a recent dilemma. When our Federal Constitution was adopted, this issue
had "perplexed and plagued the nations of Western Civilization
87
for some fourteen centuries." By including in the Bill of Rights
restrictions on federal government activity respecting an establishment of religion, the United States became unique among
nations, but delineating the reach of the Establishment Clause

84. Slone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). The federal judiciary carefully evaluates
the legislative history of challenged government policies and practices to ascertain if
they are designed to advance sectarian doctrine. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 59-61 (1985) (striking down an Alabama law calling for a daily moment of silence
for mediation or prayer in public schools as reflecting a legislative intent to have school
children engage in silent prayer).
85. See Mark Walsh, Commandments Debate Moues to Statehouse, EDUC. WEEK,
February 16, 2000, at 18, 21. See also Books v. City of Elkhart, Ind., 235 F.3d 292 (7th
Cir. 2000) (finding that erection of a monument with the Ten Commandments on the
municipal building lawn violated the Establishment Clause); See Doe v. Harlan County
Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (enjoining the posting of the Ten Commandments in Harlan County schools).
86. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. Horace Mann League of the U.S. v. Board of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51, 60 (Md.
1966).
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has remained elusive. Although "neutrality" often is used to
characterize the constitutionally required relationship between
government and religion, there has never been sufficient elaboration as to exactly what the term means or how it can be attained. Stephen Smith has asserted that finding a truly neutral
theory of religious freedom is impossible in part due to the fact
that such "theories are always offered from the viewpoint of
one of the competing positions that generate the need for such
,89
a th eory.
In fact, "neutrality" has been championed both by those asserting that government involvement with religion is permissi90
ble and by those claiming that it is strictly prohibited. Often
cited as the basis for the separationist position is the historic
Memorial and Remonstrance, adopted in Virginia in 1786, in
which James Madison argued that the government should have
91
no jurisdiction over religion.
In 194 7, Justice Rutledge
equated neutrality with "a complete and permanent separation
of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
92
religion," and Justice Clark wrote for the Supreme Court in
1963 that "wholesome neutrality" withdraws "all legislative
9
power respecting religious belief or expression." a According to
Justice Souter, the concept of"neutrality" shifted in Lemon and
its progeny, from "labeling the required position of the government to describing a benefit that was nonreligious."!J4
Currently, however, the term has a much more accommoda-

88. Most Establishment Clause litigation has taken place since the mid-twentieth
century after the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the religion clauses and making their restrictions, originally directed toward the
federal government, applicable to state action as well. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The first major Establishment Clause decision was Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (194 7), supra note 52.
89. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 97 (1995).
90. See generally, Lisa W. Hanks, Justice Souter: Defining "Substantive Neutrality" in an Age of Religious Politics, 48 STAN. L. REV. 903 (1996); John T. Valauri, The
Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83 (1986).
91. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli~:ious Assessments,
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 1786. Justice Rutledge appended to his dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947) (Rutledge, J. dissenting), the
entire Remonstrance, id. at 63, and the bill to which it was directed (A Bill Establishing
a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion), id. at 72.
92. 330 U.S. at 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
93. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
94. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 8. Ct. 2530, 2578 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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tionist connotation and seems to be used primarily to depict
nondiscrimination toward religion, which Laycock refers to as
95
"formal neutrality." In 1995, Justice Kennedy opined for the
Supreme Court: "We have held that the guarantee of neutrality
is respected, not offended, when government, following neutral
criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients
whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are
96
broad and diverse." At least four of the current Supreme
Court Justices equate "neutrality" with evenhanded treatment
97
of religious and secular concerns in terms of government aid,
and if the Helms plurality can convince one additional Justice
to endorse this position, most types of government assistance
made available to public and religious schools alike would satisfy the Establishment Clause. Legislatures certainly will capitalize on the plurality's reasoning in Helms to press the limits
of religious accommodations allowed under the Establishment
Clause.
The plurality's logic will be used to argue not only that government assistance to nonpublic schools should expand, but
also that the Constitution presents no barrier to proposals to
fund education by providing parents with vouchers to use at
the public or private school of their choice. Assuming that the
aid under a voucher program is distributed in an evenhanded
manner and goes to parochial schools only because of private
actions, the criteria articulated by the Helms plurality would
be satisfied. Despite the mixed scoreboard of lower court rul98
ings involving voucher programs, the prospects have become
95. See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990). See also Daniel 0. Conkle, The
Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality
and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L. J. 1 (2000).
96. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
97. See the Helms plurality, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000), supra note 29.
98. Striking down voucher plans on Establishment Clause grounds, see 234 F.3d
445 (6th Cir. 2000) Stout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999), injunction stayed pending
appellate reuiew, 120 S. Ct. 443 (1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127
(Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364 (1999). Rejecting Establishment Clause challenges, see Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1 (1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 997 (1998). Striking down voucher programs on state constitutional grounds, see Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont
Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1066 (1999); Gincomucci
v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 742 A.2d 1165 (Pa. Commw. 1999). Rejecting a challenge
to a voucher program under state law, see Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. App.
2000). See also Kolterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
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considerably brighter for a favorable Supreme Court ruling on
this topic. If voucher programs do expand and dramatically increase government aid to parochial schools, this could change
the public/private school ratio in our nation, which would affect
the electorate's support for public education. Indeed, of the two
recent Supreme Court decisions, Helms appears to have the
most substantial implications over the long haul, both in terms
of education in our nation and Establishment Clause doctrine.
For a period during the 1990s, it appeared that nondiscrimination neutrality also was becoming the dominant consideration in assessing the constitutionality of sectarian influences in public schools if religious expression was involved. As
discussed, the Supreme Court in Mergens, Lamb's Chapel, and
Rosenberger made some potent statements regarding the equal
treatment of sectarian and secular private expression and expanded what would be considered private (in contrast to gov99
ernment-sponsored) expression.
Thus, support for equal
treatment of religious expression seemed to be gaining momentum in Establishment Clause litigation pertaining to religious
observances and influences in public education. But the Santa
Fe ruling, although not altering the principle that the Free
Speech Clause protects private religious expression, has put
some limits on the types of student expression considered "private" and thus beyond the reach of the Establishment Clause.
Justice O'Connor may be the wild card who could determine
whether a new accommodationist majority is formed on the
Court that will adopt the neutrality principle of the Helms plurality at least in state-aid cases. In the past, she has voiced
support for "private-choice neutrality" in that decisions b~ pri10
vate actors do not implicate the Establishment Clause.
She
reiterated such support for "true private-choice programs" in
Helms, suggesting that she would view as constitutional gov-

810 (1999) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to state tax credit of up to $500
for contributions to school tuition organizations to support private school tuition); Martha McCarthy, School Voucher Plans: Are They Legal? 26 J. EDUC. FIN. 1 (2000).
99. See supra notes 67, 71, and 73. As discussed, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals already has espoused a broad interpretation of nondiscrimination neutrality in
finding no Establishment Clause violation in a school district's policy granting religious
groups access to the public school to distribute Bihles and other sectarian materials on
the same terms with secular community groups. See Peck v. Upshur County Ed. of
Educ., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998), supra text accompanying note 83.
100. Witters v. Washington Dep't ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,493 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ernment aid that flows to private schools because of parents'
101
decisions. Thus, Justice O'Connor may join Justices Thomas,
Scalia, and Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist in upholding
school voucher plans and possibly other types of government
aid to religious institutions. Prospects are better for nondiscrimination neutrality to become the standard in state-aid
cases than in cases involving student-initiated devotionals in
public education. Only three of the current members of the Supreme Court - Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist - have steadfastly advocated a~plying this standard
1
to religious expression in public schools. Justice Kennedy is
the most promising candidate to join this group since he already has voiced support for nondiscrimination neutrality in
state-aid cases. But he has not reflected a consistent pattern in
church/state rulings involving schools. He is the only current
Justice who has voted with the majority in all educationrelated Establishment Clause cases since he joined the Court,
whether upholdin~ or invalidating the contested government
03
practices at issue, so it is difficult to place Justice Kennedy
squarely in the separationist or accommodationist camp. He
101. 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2559-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But she agreed with Justice Souter that nondiscrimination neutrality as defined by Justice Thomas is not sufficient as the single criterion to justify government aid to religious schools. See id. at
2557-58. See also supra text accompanying note 44.
102. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319-324 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.). See also infra text accompanying note 19.
103. He joined the majority in Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board ofEduc.
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); and Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). In one Establishment Clause case involving
schools, while supporting the holding of the majority, he wrote a concurring opinion,
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In one nonschool Establishment Clause ruling he also concurred, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 587, 624 (1988) (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ., concurring) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the facial validity of the Adolescent Family Life Act that provides grants to secular and sectarian organizations for
research and services pertaining to premarital adolescent sexual activity and specifies
that counseling services cannot advocate abortions). Also, in another nonschool case,
Justice Kennedy concurred in part and dissented in part, County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring, Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy,
White, & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority in upholding display of a
menorah with a Christmas tree outside the city-county office building, but disagreeing
that the display of the creche in county courthouse abridged the Establishment
Clause).
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signed the sweeping plurality opinion in Helms but has not always been aligned with the other three Justices in the plurality
who have not deviated from an accommodationist stance in Establishment Clause cases involving public or private school issues. Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented in Santa Fe, whereas Justice
Kennedy sided with the Santa Fe majority and during oral arguments seemed quite concerned about student elections de104
termining whether devotionals would take place. But Justice
Kennedy also has not usually espoused the reasoning of the
separationist group. Although he wrote the Court's opinion in
Lee v. Weisman, he was the only Justice in the five-member
majority who required evidence of coercion to invalidate the
105
clergy-led graduation prayers. The other four Justices signed
concurring opinions indicating that coercion was sufficient, but
106
not required, to abridge the Establishment Clause.
Thus, it
may be possible to convince Justice Kennedy that the bar
should be raised for the Supreme Court to find public school
practices in violation of the Establishment Clause since he already has asserted that at least some form of religious coercion
would have to be present.
Still another Justice would be needed to form a solid accommodationist majority favoring nondiscrimination neutrality
in assessing student-led devotionals in public schools. Of the
remaining Justices, only Justice O'Connor seems to be a possi107
bility, although it is doubtful that she would transfer her
support of "private-choice neutrality" to student decisions to
104. Mark Walsh, Court Hears Arguments in Prayer Case, EDUC. WEEK., April 5,
2000, at 27.
105. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594-96 (1992).
106. The concurring Justices in Weisman asserted that evidence of government
endorsement of religion suffices to abridge the First Amendment. !d. at 599 (Blackmun, Stevens, & O'Connor, JJ., concurring); id. at 609 (Souter, Stevens & O'Connor,
JJ., concurring).
107. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg are quite unlikely to do so, given that
their voting records favor separationist doctrine. Although Justice Breyer has a mixed
voting record in state-aid cases (dissenting in Agostini and Rosenberger, but concurring
in Helms), he voted with the majority in Santa Fe, which is the only case involving devotional activities in public schools that the Court has reviewed during his tenure on
the high court. His position in Helms may be the anomaly, as he seems more aligned
with the "separationist" group. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2556 (O'Connor
& Breyer, JJ., concurring); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 255 (1997) (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 863 (1995)
(Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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lead devotional activities in public schools. She voted with the
majority both in Weisman and Santa Fe, suggesting that she
may continue to apply a more stringent standard in assessing
religious observances in public schools than in evaluating state
108
aid to parochial schools.
Nonetheless, she made the oftenquoted statement that "there is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect" and
has voiced strong support for protecting private religious ex109
pression in public education. So, it is not beyond the realm of
possibility that in a future decision she might vote to expand
the types of student speech classified as "private."

VI. CONCLUSION
Even if the current Justices maintain the tenuous alliances
evident in Santa Fe and Helms, reflecting somewhat divergent
strands of Establishment Clause analysis depending on the issue and school setting, new appointments to the Supreme
Court are eminent. Several Justices have had health problems,
and three are seventy or older. Assuming that eighty-year-old
Justice Stevens, who is among the more separationist-oriented
current Justices, is replaced by a Justice who supports governmental accommodation toward religion, the constitutionality of voucher programs and other government assistance to
sectarian schools will be assured, and additional religious influences in public schools will likely be upheld. Moreover, a
shift in the Court's composition could have a formidable impact
on Establishment Clause doctrine in general, perhaps signaling
a directional shift even more significant than the adoption of

108. See 530 U.S. 290 2266 (2000); 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Justice O'Connor also concurred in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (Powell & O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (striking down a Louisiana law, calling for equal emphasis on creation science
whenever evolution is taught in public schools, as advancing religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause).
109. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., conncurring) (arguing that, "neutrality, in both form and effect, is one
hallmark of the Establishment Clause," in that religion is neither endorsed nor disadvantaged); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990). Justice O'Connor also was in the majority in Lamb's Chapel and concurred in
Rosenberger. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993).
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the Lemon test in the early 1970s. Activity in this volatile
area of constitutional law during the next decade may affect
the contours of our religious liberties for generations to come.

110. See supra notes 20, 38.

